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• 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
July 11, 1977 
Dear · Senator Eastland: 
Attorney General Griffin Bell recently addressed 
himself to the legal effects of the consumer agency 
bill. In doing so, he rejected claims that the 
legislation raises constitutional questions of 
separation of powers or unlawful delegation of 
authority. 
Specifically, Attorney General Bell concludes that 
the consumer agency would not wield unprecedented 
power to seek judicial review nor would it be out-
side the bounds of adequate checks and balances. 
Because I believe that his comments will be useful 
to you in analyzing this important consumer bill, 
a copy is enclosed. 
Once again, if you have any questions about the 
bill, please do not hesitate to call me at 456-6590. 
Sincerely, 
Esther Peterson 
Special Assistant to the President 
for Consumer Affairs 
The Honorable James O. Eastland 
United States Senate 
Washington, D. C. 20510 
Enclosure 
@fft~ nf tIF~ -~ttnmrQ ~ rnrrul 
WU£fqingtnn, E. (!1. 2nS3U 
Honorable Abraham A. Ribicoff 
Chairman 
Committee on C-overnmental Affairs 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
June 21, 1977 
This letter is in response to your request for the views of 
the Department of Justice on S. 1262, the Consumer Protection 
_ Act of 1977. The bill would establish in the executive branch 
an independent Agency for Consumer Advocacy to be headed by an 
Administrator appointed by the President with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. The central t11rust of the bill is to 
authorize,the Administrator to intervene or participate in on-
going federal agency proceedings or activities that may "sub-
stantially affect ff an interest of consumers a.nd --to the 
extent that any person would by law have the right -- to 
initiate or intervene in a federal court action involving the 
review -of agency action that, again, may affect an interest of 
consumers. At issue is whether reposing this authority in an 
executive branch agency creates constitutional problems and 
whether an agency with this authority would disrupt or adversely 
affect the functions of other governmental agencies or depart-
ments. 
First, it is argued that the provision allowing the agency 
to sue other federal agencies somehow violates the constitutional 
requirement o-f a "case or controversy" before the jurisdiction of 
a federal court can be invoked. Ho~vever, the fact that a dispute 
• 
involves two components of the executive branch is not enough in 
and of itself to preclude a federal court from exercising juris-
diction. See United States v. Nixoq, 418 u.s. 683, 693 (1974); 
Chapman v. Federal Power Commissio~, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953). 
Because the Administrator is to represent the interests of 
consumers there will be, in our opinion, sufficient adversari-
ne~s to satisfy the requiremen.ts .of Article III under the holdings 
in Nixon and Chapman; put a ~ittle differently, in exercising his 
authority u11der the Act the Adrri.nistrator vlould not be engaged in 
an "in tr,a- branch" dis~pu te. 
The second constitutionally related question is raised 
by charges that the new Agency would not be subject to the 
normal checks that govern executive branch operations. The 
Administrator is appointed by the President with the advice 
and consent of the Senate. The Agency's authority will be 
·grounded in an Act passed by Congress and will have been 
subjected to standards and restrictions expressly approved by 
the legislative branch. This process follows the constitutionally 
acceptable manner of creating, selecting and controlling executive 
branch agencies and the heads thereof. Mention must also be 
made, of course, of the continuing congressional involvement 
in the agency's affairs through the appropriation process. 
To put the powers and responsibilities of the proposed 
agency in perspective one has only to refer to what the Agency 
could and coul~ not do under th,e Act. }rlos t importantly , it 
would have no regulatory po'\ver. No nevI rules, regulations or 
standards of conduct will be promulgated by the Agency. Its 
ro l e in the administrative and judicial process is generally 
limi ted to participating -- in the same m,anner, to the same 
extent and under the same rules as apply to a private party --
in the rulemaking and adjudicatory. actiol1S of other agencies 
and the review of those -actions by the courts. The Agency 
could not isstie cease and desist or other adjudicatory orders. 
Its power to affect the decision making or regulatory process 
of other ~ federal agencies is thus limited to an advocacy role 
on behalf of consumers. Contrast this role to the vast regu-
latory powers of other executive branch departments and agencies 
and it is apparent that S. 1262 does not raise constitutional 
problems of separation of powers or the unlawful delegation of 
authority. -, 
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-Next, as the foregoing discussion illustrates, 'the proposed 
Agency would not unduly disrupt or adversely affect other govern-
ment departments or agencies. It is nothing new for one agency 
to formally intervene in the proceedings of another. For example, 
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice regularly 
intervenes in other agency proceedings in furtherance of its 
congressional mandate to promote competitiono Suffice to say 
that the creation of an agency to assert the consumer perspecliv'e 
in agency or court proceedings is not extraordinary or out of 
line with governmenta,l initiatives on behalf , of other constituencies 
such as labor, businessmen or farmers. 
It also seems appropriate to respond to the questions that 
have beeQ raised concerning how the consumer interest will be 
determined. The bill defines f'consumer" as a user (for personal, 
family or household purposes) of goods or services. This is a 
common sense definition that establishes a sufficient standard, 
in my opinion, to indicate the nature of the proceedings with 
which the Agency will be concerned as well as the positions it 
will advocate. That the Agency may on occasion be faced with 
arguably conflicting "consumer interests'f and be forced to make 
what may be difficult choices or refrain from participating at 
all is not a troublesome prospect. Other executive branch 
agencies mus t make similar decisions an'd determinations on an 
almost daily basis. 
I appreciate the opportunity to present this Department's 




Griffin B. Bell 
Attorney General 
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